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Introduction and Statement of the Research Problem  
 Many decisions we face are characterized by risk or uncertainty — we 
must make choices prior to knowing the outcome.  However, we often know the potential 
outcomes and even have some idea regarding the likelihood of each.  
While there are similarities in how people respond to risky decisions, there are 
also differences related to factors like gender (e.g. Levin et al., 1998) and culture (e.g., 
Kleinhesselink and Rossa, 1991; Weber et al., 1998).  Understanding these similarities 
and differences can help our understanding of a range of economic phenomena.  For 
example, why does entrepreneurship flourish in some countries while it stagnates in 
others? 
 Risk perceptions and risk preferences are widely recognized by economist as the 
major factors influencing risky behavior. Risk perceptions characterize the likelihood of 
chance outcomes and are usually framed in economics in terms of subjective 
probabilities.  Risk preferences rank outcomes based on individual wants. 
An understanding of how to use public policy to positively influence risky 
behavior requires understanding to what extent differences in risky behavior are 
attributable to differences in risk perceptions versus differences in risk preferences. For 
example, if risk perceptions are the driving factor educational efforts, advertising, and, in 
general, increased communication about the actual risk may have the desired impact.  In 
the case of entrepreneurship, communication efforts could include information about 
successful start up companies or seminars on how to successfully establish a new 
business.  If risk preferences are the driving factor, better information alone may be 
ineffective.  Policy makers could instead influence behavior by providing programs to - 2 - 
alleviate risk or help individuals manage risk. An insurance program or start up grants in 
these instances may be a viable policy for improving entrepreneurship. 
 The purpose of this research is to develop a novel experimental protocol for 
measuring individual differences in risk perceptions and risk preferences.  This 
experimental protocol will then be used to explore how individual differences in 
subjective probabilities and risk preferences relate to objective probabilities, demographic 
characteristics, and information. 
The experimental protocol consists of three tasks.  After randomly dividing 
participants into 2 groups, one group is given a short children’s story to read. Second, all 
subjects will be asked to complete a survey.  The survey will ask general demographic 
questions (e.g. age, gender, and family background). It will also ask 20 questions 
designed to elicit cultural information based on Geert Hofstede (2001). Lastly, subjects 
will be asked how much they are willing to pay to play a more favorable lottery. This 
question will be repeated with 20 different lottery combinations, which will vary by the 
scale of rewards. Furthermore, how a favorable outcome is determined will vary between 
the two groups. The group that received the short story will have probabilities phrased as 
randomly choosing of specific word or letter or a combination from story. For the other 
group, poker chips will be randomly drawn out of a can. A random drawing scheme will 
be implemented for one randomly selected lottery combination in order to provide 
incentives for thoughtful responses. Payoffs will be paid out in cash based on the 
outcome of the chosen lottery and the individual’s choice. The experiment will be 
conducted with a total of 60 undergraduate students from two to three U.S. universities in 
late spring 2006. - 3 - 
 Responses to the lottery questions will be used to fit a state contingent utility 
function (Arrow, 1953; and Debreu, 1959).  A variety of flexible forms will be 
considered.  The parameter estimates for the state contingent utility function will be used 
to test whether the subjective probability of the favorable outcome equals the objective 
probability and whether subjective probabilities differ based on how the favorable 
outcome is determined and the scale of the rewards. Individual differences in subjective 
probabilities as defined by Chambers and Quiggin (2000) and risk preferences as defined 
by Yaari (1969) will also be tested.  The relationship between demographic (and cultural) 
characteristics and differences in subjective probabilities and risk preferences will also be 
explored. 
 The two treatment variables in this experiment include how a favorable outcome 
is determined and the scale of the rewards.  Varying how a favorable outcome is 
determined varies the information available to subjects for assessing the likelihood of a 
favorable reward.  A question of interest is whether restricting information influences risk 
preferences as well as subjective probabilities.  With poker chips, subjects have complete 
information on which to base risk perceptions and we therefore expect to find little 
difference between subjective and objective probabilities. For randomly selecting a 
word/letter from a recently read short story, subjects have a restricted set of information 
upon which to base risk perceptions, which could result in subjective probability 
judgments substantially differing from the objective probability. The literature suggests a 
person’s subjective probabilities tend to overestimate low and underestimate high 
objective probabilities.  Varying the scale of the reward is expected to influence risk 
preferences (Hartog et al., 2002; Holt and Laury, 2002).  But a question that has not been - 4 - 
explored is whether varying the scale of the rewards has an even more profound effect on 
risk perceptions as defined by Chambers and Quiggin (2000).  
Of the demographic information we will collect, gender has been most commonly 
related to differences in risky behavior.  Women often appear more risk averse than men 
(e.g. Levin et al., 1998), but Hurley and Shogren (2005) suggest gender differences in 
risky behavior may be better explained by differences in risk perceptions.  Our 
experimental design will allow us to explore this issue more rigorously.  
 The results of this project will contribute methodologically to the economics 
literature by providing a refined experimental protocol for measuring differences in 
individual risk perceptions and risk preferences.  This tool will facilitate research on how 
public policy can be used to positively influence risky behavior.  It also will provide more 
concrete evidence on gender differences in risky behavior, while providing a benchmark 
for future studies of cross-cultural differences in risky behavior. 
A variety of extensions for this research are possible that would be useful for an 
extended policy debate. Firstly, one could conduct the study with different ethnic groups 
or in a foreign country to capture the influence of cross-cultural differences. To obtain 
data on risk preferences and risk perceptions on a different group of people, one could 
also conduct the study with small farmers in various countries to be able to derive policy 
implications for technology adoption. 
This study has important implications for the advancement of experimental 
economics as well as risk perception studies. The majority of risk research is concerned 
with risk preferences. Risk preferences reflect an individuals’ intrinsic attitude towards 
risky behavior or decisions and have been researched extensively. They are important for - 5 - 
the evaluation of consequences and thus for decision-making. On the other hand, it has 
become evident that the perceived rather than the actual risk determines an individual’s 
actions and choices.  
Cunnigham (1967) defined risk perceptions as a “consumer’s subjective feeling 
that there is some probability that a choice may lead to an undesirable outcome”. One 
could think of decision-making under risk as a two step process: Firstly, the risk is 
evaluated using one’s own risk perception. Secondly, once the risk is determined, risk 
preferences come into play to determine what action or alternative is chosen. In this 
context, it is clear that risk preferences and perceptions have to be analyzed jointly. Few 
studies have addressed this issue but as shown in Weber et al. (1998) and Pennings et al. 
(2002) it leads to interesting insights that allow a more robust conceptualization of risky 
behavior and more refined policy recommendations. Because risk preferences have been 
studied more extensively in the literature, the emphasis of this research is on risk 
perceptions while also incorporating risk preferences.  
This research relies on the Ramsey-Savage utility decision-making approach 
(Savage, 1954; Ramsey, 1931). Among others, Davidson, Suppes and Siegel (1957) 
pointed out that the classical Expected Utility Theory does not adequately represent 
individual decision-making because individuals cannot be assumed to be perfectly 
rational and the necessary existence and knowledge of an objective probability for the 
event in question is unrealistic. Kahnemann and Tversky (1979) have become famous for 
their prospect theory and consecutively cumulative prospect theory that offers a 
behavioral economics alternative. Personal, psychological or subjective probabilities have 
surfaced as alternatives to objective probabilities but have not been recognized by a wide - 6 - 
audience even though they have been acknowledged more than 80 years ago by Bruno de 
Finetti (1937). The concept of subjective probability is defined by Savage (1972, p.3) and 
similarly de Finetti as a measure of confidence that an individual has in the truth of a 
particular proposition such as whether it will rain tomorrow. The response is individual 
specific and thus makes it possible to deal with single events and the induction problem. 
Given that notion, we will maintain that even subjective probability must adhere to rules 




Methods of analysis 
 
Theoretical and conceptual framework 
The conceptual and theoretical framework used for this research is an expansion 
of the state-dependent theory developed by Arrow (1953) and Debreu (1959). This 
approach also connects to Expected Utility Theory and subjective probabilities (Savage, 
1954). The concept of subjective probability is based on the behavioristic idea that they 
are a measure of an individual’s belief about the occurrence of an uncertain event 
(Savage, 1972 and de Finetti, 1937). The measure is individual specific and depends on 
personal experience as much as on circumstance. we will still maintain that subjective 
probability must adhere to rules of coherence, and certain axioms. 
The basic proposition of the state-dependent model is that goods can be 
differentiated by states in addition to their physical properties and location in space. The 
notion of states is applicable to a variety of practical situations and is a wide ranging as 
different times of the day, different environmental conditions like different cultures or 
                                                 
1 An example is that the probabilities of all possible events must add up to unity.  - 7 - 
alternative investment projects. The state-dependence approach permits the application of 
standard choice theory to the analysis of decision-making under risk. The theory requires 
that states are mutually exclusive an that they are exogenous to the decision-maker. They 
are chosen by nature. An individual’s decision could have different outcomes depending 
on which state occurs. For example, the decision to not carry an umbrella could prove to 
be a good one in the case that it doesn’t rain (state 1). However, if it rains (state 2) the 
individual gets wet.  
More formally, the individual chooses actions  a, which yield state-specific 
outcomes ys. In our case, the individual has choice between lotteries and is required to 
state one of the states payoffs that would make him indifferent between 2 different 
lotteries. Following the notation by Chambers and Quiggin (2000), we can define 
  } ,..., 1 { S = W , the set of states  
 
M Y ￿ ˝ , the space of consequences, outcomes or payoffs where  Y y˛  
 
M A ￿ ﬁ W : , an action generates a range of outcomes according to the realized 
state of nature ( A a˛ ) 
 
S M A y
* ) ( ￿ ˛ , each act defines a state dependent outcome 
  ￿ ﬁ
S Y W : , a preference function over states  ) (y W  
  ￿ ﬁ ￿ : u , a utility function  
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We will maintain that although probability judgments are subjective, they are non-
random and influenced by individual characteristics (i.e. experience, knowledge, - 8 - 
information) as well as the underlying objective probability. Subjective probabilities are 
closely related to beliefs, preferences and objective probability. In the example of the 
decision to carry an umbrella, an individual with the knowledge that clouds and rain are 
related will place a higher probability on the chance that it will rain if it is cloudy than for 
the case that there are blue skies and sunshine. This individual will therefore be more 
likely to carry an umbrella (observed behavior) if it is cloudy out. The objective 
probability might be unknown but that does not imply it does not exist.  
Probability judgments will be inferred from observed behavior. To simplify the 
analysis, we am restricting the analysis to monetary terms. This relationship is uniquely 
defined for the case of 2 states and smooth, differentiable, monotone utility functions. We 
will use the definition for risk aversion by Yaari (1969) and Chambers and Quiggin 
(2000): A decision-maker is risk-averse with respect to the probability vector if he at least 
weakly prefers the average income for certain to any other potential distribution of 
income or more formally: 
Def.:   A decision-maker is risk-averse with respect to the probability vector  P ˛ p if 
y y 1 " ‡ ) ( ) ( W y W
s  where 
s y1 is a state-contingent outcome vector with 
￿ W ˛ =
s s sy y p  occurring in each state. (Refers to uncertainty versus certainty) 
If preferences are smoothly differentiable, this definition of risk aversion implies 
an equal slope along the equal incomes vector. The Equal Incomes Vector (EIV) is 
defined as the vector starting at the origin where payoffs are equal in all states. After 
estimating the utility function, we can thus derive local measures of risk aversion along 
the equal incomes vector. Under the additional assumption that preferences remain stable 
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probabilities is equal to the marginal rate of substitution (MRS) between state-contingent 
outcomes. However, if preferences are indeed stable will be tested during this study. In 
case they are not, the MRS is equal to the ratio of subjective probabilities multiplied by 
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 A comparison of inferred subjective probabilities with the induced objective 
probabilities will provide insights into evaluation biases. Assuming 2 states } 2 , 1 { = W , 
risk-verse smooth preferences and no free disposal, we can depict the basic model 
graphically as follows: 
Figure 1: Graphical illustration of state-dependent model for 2 states 
The Fair Odds Line (FOL) is defined as the line that connects all points with the 
same expected value at given probabilities (Chambers and Quiggin, 2000). For this risk-
averse individual, point A must be at least weakly preferred to all other points such as B 
on the fair-odds line (FOL) because for all other points income is more dispersed. 
Consequently, they are riskier than A. For a risk-averse individual, in point A, the 
marginal rate of substitution between y1 and y2 will have to equal the ratio of subjective - 10 - 
probabilities. Following the notation in Chambers and Quiggin (2000), we can compute 
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Specifically using subjective expected utility, we can infer subjective probabilities 
once we have estimated the utility function from the data as 
(3)   ( )
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(4)   ￿ W ˛ =
s s 1 p . 
The probabilities have to sum to unity and with non-decreasing preferences they 
always have to be non-negative. 
 
Topics for Analysis 
There are a variety of issues that will be analyzed as part of this research: scale 
invariance, preference reversal and loss aversion, the difference between objective and 
subjective probabilities, the impact of information on subjective probabilities and risk 
preferences, and the importance of individual (and cultural) characteristics and the 
relevance of an endowment effect.  
Certainty Effect 
One aspect of people making decisions different than assumed by expected utility 
theory is the preference for certainty that can be observed with relatively simple - 11 - 
experiments. The certainty effect states that individuals prefer outcomes that are certain 
over outcomes that are probable even though the expected positive gain is higher (within 
limit). Most events or decisions under risk in real life deal with risky alternatives, which 
is why this study does not focus on comparing a certain and a risky lottery. However, we 
included three lotteries containing such a pairing to test whether there is a certainty 
effect.  
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion 
 In order to identify each individual’s subjective probability within the state-
dependent framework, we need to ensure constant absolute risk aversion or scale 
invariance. We can compute the Arrow-Pratt measure of absolute risk aversion, ) (y r  
once we estimated each individual’s utility function as 
(5)  
) ( '







r - =  
Depending on how  ) (y r changes with changes in income y, the individual can 
display increasing, constant and absolute risk aversion. Constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) ensures that rescaling of rewards with the same magnitude will result in the 
same absolute risk premium. Because the scaling factors as well as payoffs in this study 
are relatively small, we expect CARA to hold.  
Def. 1: The subjective utility function  ) (y W exhibits constant absolute risk aversion 
(CARA) if, for any y and ￿ ˛ t   ) ( ) ( y 1 y r t r
s = + .  
Figure 2 shows an illustration of scale invariance and its implications for willingness to 
pay to trade a risky (y) for a certain lottery y and the rescaled equivalents.  
 
 - 12 - 
Figure 2: Scale Invariance 
 
Scale invariance requires that we can confirm 
C WTP WTP = or 
( ) ( )
B B
C C y y CΕ CE - = -  where B is the risky lottery, no subscript refers to the original 
lottery, the parameter ‘c’ indicates the rescaled lottery combination, and CE is the 
certainty equivalent for the risky lottery in the original as well as the rescaled lottery. The 
certainty equivalent is the amount of payoff that an agent would have to receive to be 
indifferent between that payoff and a given gamble. An agent’s willingness to pay For a 
risk-averse agent the certainty equivalent is less than the expected value of the gamble 
because the agent prefers to reduce uncertainty. Chambers and Quiggin (2001) establish 
the result that “ ) (y W displays CARA if and only if  ) (y W is translation homothetic, that 
is, a continuous non-decreasing transformation of a function satisfying the translation 
property”. 
Failure to confirm scale invariance would prohibit the joint elicitation of risk 
perceptions and risk preferences because neither could be estimated uniquely any longer. 
) (y W  
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Changes in willingness to pay for rescaled payoff structures could then be caused by 
changes in risk preferences and/or changes in risk perceptions.  
Constant Relative Risk Aversion 
The disadvantage of using absolute risk aversion as a measure of an agent’s risk 
preference lays in its inability to capture changes of risk preferences that are due to 
changes in wealth. For example, an agent could be risk-loving for small payoffs, risk-
averse for medium payoffs and again risk-loving for high payoffs.  An alternative would 
be to weigh the measure of risk aversion by the level of wealth y. In this case we obtain 
the Arrow-Pratt Measure of Relative Risk-Aversion: 
(6)  
) ( '
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Def. 2: The subjective utility function  ) (y W exhibits constant relative risk aversion 
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 Constant relative risk aversion means that radial expansions or contractions of the 
state-contingent return vector should not alter the individual’s attitude toward risk. 
“ ) (y W displays CRRA if and only if  ) (y W is homethetic
2, that is, a monotonic 
transformation of a linearly homogeneous function.” (Chambers and Quigging, 2001) In 
the expected utility framework used for this research, this implies that individuals must 
have homogeneous preferences.  Graphically, any ray from the origin will then cut all 
indifference curves at points of equal slope (Chambers and Quiggin, 2001).  
                                                 
2 A function of two or more arguments is homothetic if all ratios of its first partial derivatives depend only 
on the ratios of the arguments, not their levels. For competitive consumers or producers optimizing subject 
to homothetic utility or production functions, this means that ratios of goods demanded depend only on 
relative prices, not on income or scale (Deardorff, 2001). - 14 - 
Difference between Subjective and Objective Probability 
There are a variety of reasons why subjective probabilities might be biased. Table 
1 summarizes these biases in assessing probabilities that have been identified in the 
literature, which could drive differences to objective probabilities and which are relevant 
for this study. 
Table 1: Types of Biases in Assessing Probabilities
3 
Bias  Description 
Insensitivity to prior probability of 
outcomes 
Underweighting of prior information (base rates) 
Biases due to Retrievability of Instances 
 
Affected by familiarity, salience: overweighting of 
familiar events, least and most pleasant memories recalled 
faster 
Biases due to the Effectiveness of a 
Search Set 
Availability or ability to recall events 
Biases due to Imaginability 
 




3  Judgments of confidence overemphasize strength of 
evidence 




Figure 3 depicts an example where objective and subjective probabilities differ 
but the utility function is the same. Assuming a concave, smooth and differentiable utility 
function and objective probabilities of  6 . 0 1 = p  and 4 . 0 2 = p , we obtain an objective Fair 
Odds Line with as slope of  2
3
2
1 - = - p
p  and a tangency at payoffs of payoffs of $4. As 
can be seen, the subjective Fair Odds Line is flatter (slope of 1 5 . 0
5 . 0
2
1 - = - = - p
p ) 
although the underlying utility function is the same. Consequently, the high probability 
was under- and the low probability overestimated.  
                                                 
3  Camerer (1995) in Handbook of Experimental Economics: 587-677, Kahneman, Tversky and Slovic 
(1982), Tversky and Kahneman (1972 and 1971) 
4  This bias is not expected to be relevant with the group of participants use for this study because they 
should have some basic knowledge of probability and the probability is phrased in a straightforward 
manner.  - 15 - 
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Predictors of Risk Perceptions 
 A number of studies have attempted to explain predictors for individual’s risk 
perception. Socio-demographics appear to play a role along with personal characteristics 
on a psychological level in determining an individual’s risk perception and preference. 
Cultural factors that affect all individuals of a certain culture similarly are also expected 
to be relevant.  
 Perceptions are influenced by amongst others the situation, emotional state of the 
individual, personal experiences with the same of similar risks, timing, and socio-
demographic background like age, gender and location. For example, British people 
potentially perceive the likelihood of another BSE outbreak as higher than US Americans 
because they have experienced similar events before while there have only been scattered 
outbreaks in the US. 
 Eckel and Grossman (2003) in their effort to test for gender differences could not 
find significance for other standard demographic variables such as age, race or 
employment status. Dosman et al. (2001) analyze the significance of socioeconomic 
determinants of risk perceptions of food safety and health issues using a multivariate - 16 - 
approach. They used an ordered probit model with risk rating of a particular hazard as 
dependent variable and socioeconomic variables as explanatory ones. Out of all socio-
economic variables used, only gender differences were significant and robust to all model 
specifications. We do not expect other socio-economic variables to be significant for this 
study because We have a self-selected somewhat homogeneous sample of college 
students at roughly the same age, income and employment level.  
Women are more likely to perceive a situation as more risky and also exhibit 
greater risk aversion than their male counterparts. Specifically, studies have found 
differences between men and women in the perception of risk towards alcohol and drug 
use (Spigner, Hawkins and Loren, 1993) catastrophic potential of nuclear war, 
technology, radioactive waste, industrial hazards and environmental degradation (Flynn, 
Slovic and Mertz, 1994) and of various recreational activities (Boverie, Scheuffele, and 
Raymond, 1995). A similar pattern can be observed for risk preference: Women are more 
risk averse towards gambles than men (Levin et al., 1998).  
 A number of studies have looked at the different aspects of culture and its 
influences on individual’s perception of risk. For example, Kleinhesselink and Rossa 
(1991) showed that students from Japan and the US use similar dimensions to rank 
hazards but their individual risk perception weighted differently in those dimensions. The 
biggest question generally lies in the formulation of measures of culture and a variety of 
theories and measures has been proposed to address this issue.  
 Weber et al. (1998) used Hofstede’s cultural dimensions and socio-demographic 
variables to determine influential factors for risk preferences and perceptions. They found 
significant differences in risk preferences across cultures but these differences were - 17 - 
primarily attributed to cultural differences in how the risk is perceived rather than with 
differences in the attitude towards risk (i.e. risk preferences). Hofstede used a scoring 
method to form country scores based on a survey of IBM employees around the world 
and the questions and formulas for index calculation are available in  Cultures 
Consequences (Hofstede, 2001). Although the country scores are available deriving 
country scores and indices will also enable us to test the results and stability of 
Hofstede’s research. The indices for all 5 dimensions are based on the mean score (MS) 
of the sample in question. Mean scores for questions for the same dimension should 
correlate but should be uncorrelated to mean scores of questions for different dimensions. 
Responses to the questions will differ not only by culture but also by demographic 
variables like education or age. To restrict the survey to college students of roughly the 
same age with similar backgrounds is therefore beneficial for cross-cultural studies 
because it controls for the effect of these other variables. 
 Scores could be formed based on sub-samples for 1. the entire sample, 2. all 
respondents from the same university and lastly 3. for male and female respondents. The 
indices typically fall between 0 and 100 but technically scores above 100 or below 0 are 
possible.  
 The index for power distance (PDI) measures the extent to which members of the 
society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. A low score indicates small 
power distance (more equal distribution of power) and equivalently a high score indicates 
large power distance. 
 (7)   20 ) 17 . 2 ( 20 ) 14 . 2 ( 25 ) 6 . 2 ( 35 ) 3 . 2 ( 35 - - + + - = Q MS Q MS Q MS Q MS PDI  - 18 - 
 For the individualism index (IDV) a low score represents strongly collectivist 
while a high score indicates strongly individualist that is the ties between individuals are 
loose and a person is expected to look after her/himself.  
 (8)   130 ) 8 . 2 ( 25 ) 4 . 2 ( 20 ) 2 . 2 ( 30 ) 1 . 2 ( 50 + - + + - = Q MS Q MS Q MS Q MS IDV  
 Low values of the masculinity index (MAS) indicate values of strongly feminine 
and consequently high values represent strongly masculine. This index should not be 
confused with differences in gender but rather captures societal attitudes. In masculine 
cultures emotional gender roles are clearly distinct and reflect historical roles such as 
men being assertive, strong, and focused on material success while women are tender, 
and more concerned with the quality of life. In cultures with low MAS scores, gender 
roles overlap.  
 (9)  100 ) 20 . 2 ( 70 ) 15 . 2 ( 20 ) 7 . 2 ( 20 ) 5 . 2 ( 60 + - + - = Q MS Q MS Q MS Q MS MAS  
 Uncertainty avoidance is expected be the index with the most predictive power for 
risk attitudes and perceptions. It is designed to capture the extent to which members of a 
society feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, ambiguous or unstructured events and 
situations. A low score stands for weak uncertainty avoidance that is members of the 
society feel weakly threatened.  
(10)   120 ) 19 . 2 ( 15 ) 18 . 2 ( 50 ) 16 . 2 ( 20 ) 13 . 2 ( 25 + - - + = Q MS Q MS Q MS Q MS UAI  
Lastly, long-term orientation (LTO) versus short-term measures how much a society is 
oriented towards the future rewards. A society oriented to the long-term (high score) will 
foster virtues like perseverance and thrift while a society with a short-term orientation - 19 - 
(low score) will foster virtues related to the past and present like tradition and fulfilling 
social obligations.  
(11)  40 ) 12 . 2 ( 20 ) 10 . 2 ( 20 + + - = Q MS Q MS LTO  
The Importance of Information 
The impact of information on decision-making under risk has been recognized as 
a major factor. Behavioral economists such as Tversky, Kahneman and Thaler used 
experimental economics to show that individuals do not conform to standard Baysian 
updating and are subject to a variety of biases. We therefore hypothesize that differences 
between subjective and objective probabilities decreases with the availability of 
information. The challenge lies in being able to control the objective probability and 
masquerading information about the underlying probability of a particular event. We 
assume that risky events have a true probability of occurring. For most events in real life 
this probability is unknown but can be approximated with more or less accuracy.  
Using the example of “will it rain or not”, characteristics such as wind flow, cloud 
accumulation, air pressure influence whether it will rain and measuring these factors 
allows meteorologists to estimate the likelihood of rain fall occurring. An individual 
trying to decide whether or not to carry an umbrella can do a variety of things to 
influence his subjective judgment about the possibility of rain. For example, he could 
watch or read the weather forecast, look outside himself and evaluate his past experiences 
with the weather as well as accuracy of the forecast. Eventually, formulate his subjective 
judgment about the probability of rain and make a decision about carrying an umbrella 
based on that.  Assuming the collected information is correct and relevant for predicting 
rain, his subjective probability judgment should converge to the objective probability.  - 20 - 
There is a literature that investigates updating with information in particular in the 
behavioral economics literature. The main issues are: judgments of confidence that 
overemphasize strength of evidence (Camerer, 1995, p. 587-677) but also 
underestimation of impact of new information (Kahneman, Tversky and Slovic, 1982), 
and underweighting of prior information (base rates).  
The experimental procedure for this study will test for the influence of 
information availability on risk perceptions as well as risk preferences. The participants 
will randomly be divided into 2 groups. One will receive the lotteries with probabilities 
stated in the form of drawing of poker chips from a can. The information set for this 
group will be complete providing us with a benchmark. The other group will receive 
probability statements phrased as picking a word, letter or a combination thereof from a 
recently read short story. Technically, the information for this group is also complete 
because they could count the total number of words and the number of occurrences of the 
particular word and letter and compute the probability. However, participants are not 




 The primary objective of this research is to determine biases for subjective 
probabilities and how they are affected by knowledge, socio-demographic variables, and 
objective probabilities. The analysis in this case is restricted to 2 states or events so We 
can infer subjective probabilities uniquely once a utility function is estimated for each 
individual. We require that even subjective probabilities must adhere to rules of 
coherence, and axioms such as that they sum to unity and that they lie in an interval - 21 - 
between 0 and 1. Let’s denotep as the subjective probability for event 1 and p as the 
objective probability for the same event and define  ) , ( Info p g = p where 
p Info p g = = ) , ( p serves as the benchmark. In line with previous research (e.g., Hurley 
and Shogren, 2005; Viscusi et al., 1997), we expect low objective probabilities to be 
over- and high objective probabilities to be underestimated.  
H 1:   p > p  for  r > p , wherer is high.  
This approach will yield the derivation of probability ratios. If p
p
- > - 1 1 p
p  
the subjective probability for event 1 is underestimated. The experimental set up for this 
research does not allow to test for cut off or turning points for this hypothesis because 
probabilities are held constant throughout the lottery combinations. Probabilities are fixed 
at 0.25 for state 1 and 0.75 for state 2.  
The second goal is to test if indifference curves and evaluation of probabilities are 
stable over various income levels. We can test this by eliciting multiple indifference 
curves using various payoffs y and deriving the subjective probabilities along the equal 
incomes vector.  
H 2:    p
p
- 1  is the same Y y˛ " ,  
Previous studies (Hartog et al., 2002; Holt and Laury, 2002) have shown that individuals 
become more risk-averse with an increase in rewards, which we will also expect to be 
true here. However, if this is true, eliciting risk preferences and perceptions separately 
using this approach is compromised. Denoting  i a  an individual  i’s risk aversion 
coefficient, we have  - 22 - 
H 3:     
i i
2 1 a a > if  2 1 y y >   Y y ˛ "  and   I i˛ "  
In addition in future studies conducted with multiple cultures or ethnic groups, we 
can test for cultural differences in risk preferences 
H 4:  I j i j i
j i ˛ " „ " = , , a a  where in this case i and  j are cultural groups.  
And that there are no cultural differences in risk perceptions 




s ˛ " „ " ￿ = ￿ , , ) ( ) ( p p .  
Although cultural factors have been shown to influence risky behavior (e.g., 
Kleinhesselink and Rossa, 1991; Weber et al., 1998), this study focuses on undergraduate 
students in the US who are expected to be fairly homogeneous. Here, individual 
differences will play a bigger role. Specifically gender differences have been shown to be 
relevant.  Women are more likely to perceive a situation as more risky and also exhibit 
greater risk aversion than their male counterparts. Specifically, studies have found 
differences between men and women in the perception of risk towards alcohol and drug 
use (Spigner, Hawkins and Loren, 1993) catastrophic potential of nuclear war, 
technology, radioactive waste, industrial hazards and environmental degradation (Flynn, 
Slovic and Mertz, 1994) and of various recreational activities (Boverie, Scheuffele, and 
Raymond, 1995). A similar pattern can be observed for risk preference: Women are more 
risk averse towards gambles than men (Levin et al., 1998).  
Lastly, we will test for the influence of information on assessing probabilities. 
Specifically, we will test if the subjective probability is independent of the information:  




s ˛ " ˛ " = ) ( ) , ( p p .  - 23 - 
This last section provides the necessary data to test hypotheses H 1 - H 3. 
Additionally, using the data collected in sections 1 and 2, we can test the influence of 
individual and cultural characteristics on risk preferences, perceptions and biases thus test 
H 4 and H 5. By comparing decisions and estimates between the two treatment groups, 
we can test H 6. 
 
Experimental Design 
Survey Set up 
 The survey consists of 3 sections that can be filled out in about 45 minutes. 
Section 1 consists of about 10 questions designed to elicit information about general 
demographic variables like age and gender as well as others like living situation, and 
source of income that are reflective of our sample of college students. An alternative 
factor that is expected to be correlated with risk preferences is the level of optimism, 
which is assessed by asking the participants a question about how they predict their 
earnings potential in the future.  
Section 2 is aimed at forming 5 indices that measure culture in the tradition of 
Geert Hofstede (2001), whose cultural dimensions have been shown to significantly 
influence preferences and perceptions alike. The section is aimed at facilitating future 
research in foreign countries or with participants from different ethnic background with a 
different pool of participants in the future rather than being emphasized for this analysis. 
Hofstede used a scoring method to form country scores based on a survey of IBM 
employees around the world and the questions and formulas for index calculation are 
available in Cultures Consequences (Hofstede, 2001). To enable cross-cultural research, 
the subgroups are required to be as homogeneous as possible. Therefore, we restrict our - 24 - 
analysis to college students of roughly the same age with similar backgrounds in the 
Midwest.  
  The third section will consist of the economic experiments out of which one 
randomly selected will be played out. The lottery choices will elicit indifference payoffs 
for 20 lottery combinations. The lottery set up will vary by the scale of rewards. In 
combination with the original set up of the lottery we are then also able to infer risk 
preferences and subjective probabilities. Students are randomly divided into two 
treatment groups. The first treatment will serve as the base case when all information 
about probabilities (and payoffs) is available to the participants. The second treatment 
group is asked to answer the same lottery combinations. However, to resemble the lack of 
perfect knowledge about the objective probability in real life settings probabilities will be 
given in form of likelihood of a word/letter drawn from a given short story. Students will 
not have sufficient time to determine the actual probability but after reading the story will 
have an intuition about what it might be.  
The lotteries used for the experiments in this study will be phrased in 2 ways after 
fixing probabilities: 1. we can elicit indifference payoffs for alternatives that are risky 
versus a certain lottery, i.e. a point on the EIV and 2. we can elicit indifference payoffs 
based on comparison of 2 risky alternatives. Because the second alternative is more 
interesting for application, the first one will be used in only 3 out of 20 (or 15%) lottery 
combinations.  
The survey and economic experiments will be conducted with approximately 60 
undergraduate students in introductory economics classes in 2 or 3 universities; the 
University of Minnesota, the University of Wyoming and Iowa State University. The - 25 - 
results reported in this paper are based on the first round of experiments conducted at 3 
recitation sessions on April 28, 2006 with students from a Principles of Microeconomics 
class at the University of Minnesota and another session with students from an 
intermediate microeconomics course also at the University of Minnesota. The 
questionnaire consist of 2 parts: The first segment asks respondents to answer general 
questions about their demographics (age, gender, family background). The second section 
consists of 20 questions designed to elicit cultural dimensions. The questions are directly 
taken from Geert Hofstede’s (2001) research on cultural factors and are widely used to 
form cultural indicators. Although the participants in this study will be a rather 
homogeneous group, the study is designed to be extended to include other cultural 
backgrounds either in the US or other countries in the future. A sample survey can be 
requested from the authors. 
 Although payoffs and the objective probability will be the same for both groups, 
how the outcome of the lottery is determined will vary between both groups. Probabilities 
for the first group are induced using different colored chips in a bucket and will be 
explicitly stated in each lottery. The second group will receive a similar experimental set 
up. However, probabilities are conveyed indirectly but correspond to the same objective 
probabilities as for the abstract group. Probabilities are induced by presenting students 
with the short story and will be formed as the likelihood of a certain word or letter 
occurring in the text. The total number of letters and words in the story is revealed in the 
instructions. Subjects were provided with the story at the beginning of the experiment but 
were required to return it before being given the instructions and questionnaire. There 
was not sufficient time for participants to count all words but they should have an - 26 - 
intuition about what the probability will be.  
 In the interest of obtaining a sufficient number of data points for the empirical 
analysis without overwhelming participants with a large number of lottery combinations, 
every subject received only one of the treatments. This set up does not allow direct 
comparisons of risk preferences and perceptions between complete and incomplete 
information for each subject. However, assignment occurred based on the recitation 
session which was outside of the control of the participants and thus eliminates selection 
bias. In particular, because the recitation groups occur in sequence, assignment of 
treatments was alternated in case subjects from one group would talk to the next group. In 
the aggregate, we do not expect this limitation to significantly affect our results.  
 After reading and explaining the consent form, the treatment group for the 
complete information case received the questionnaire, record sheet, instructions as well 
as the 20 lottery combinations. The order of lottery combinations was randomized but 
because group was small and communication restricted each participant received the 
same order. This method was chosen to allow subjects to view all payoff combinations, 
compare and evaluate his or her willingness to pay for each combination given all 
information. The treatment group for the incomplete information case was handed the 
short story after reading the consent form. The story “ The Princess and the Pea” by 
Hans-Christian Anderson’s was chosen because of its length (379 words without the title) 
and ease of reading and can be found in the appendix.  Most students should also be 
familiar with the story from the childhood although that is not a prerequisite.  After the 
story was read by all participants, the story was collected and subjects received the 
questionnaire, record sheet, instructions as well as the 20 lottery combinations. Each - 27 - 
participant received the same order of lottery combinations, which were also randomized 
but the order differed compared to the first group. This measure was taken to further limit 
the usefulness of talking to other subjects in experiment sessions before or after.  
 The initial round of experiments was conducted without practice rounds but due 
the at times irrational responses, practice rounds were introduced in the following 
experiment rounds with students from the intermediate mircoeconomics course to 
familiarize subjects with the reward mechanism and experimental set up as recommended 
in the literature (Camerer, 1995). Cooperation with other students (i.e. talking) was not 
permitted. The economic experiment contained 20 lottery combinations. Respondents 
were asked to state their willingness to pay to play lottery A instead of lottery B for each 
of the combinations. Participants were informed that only one randomly selected lottery 
combination will be executed at the end of the experiment and the rewards are paid in 
cash and in private at the end of the session. The lottery combination executed will be 
randomly selected for all participants in each of the two groups after all participants 
complete the survey and the lottery combinations. The experimental protocol can be 
summarized as follows: 
Experimental protocol  
1.  Randomly selecting recitation sessions into 2 treatment groups:  
1
st group: Complete information group 
2
nd group: Incomplete information group: Given a short children’s story to read 
2.  For 2
nd round of experiments, a practice round was introduced to familiarize 
subjects with the incentive mechanism. Students were asked to state their WTP 
for the first lottery combination, a random price was drawn and feedback about 
payoffs was provided.  
3.  All subjects complete the survey sections.  
4.  Subjects are repeatedly asked how much they are willing to pay to play a more 
favorable lottery. Lottery combinations vary by the scale of rewards and how a 
favorable outcome is determined (objective probabilities are equal across lotteries - 28 - 
and both groups) 
1
st group: Probabilities phrased as randomly drawing a poker chip out of a can 
2
nd group: Probabilities phrased as randomly choosing of specific word or letter or 
a combination from the story 
4.  A lottery combination that is executed is randomly selected.  
5.  Random price (RP) is drawn between zero and difference of minimum and 
maximum payoff of randomly selected lottery 
If a subject’s stated WTP≥RP ￿ play for lottery A payoffs 
If a subject’s stated WTP<RP ￿ play for lottery B payoffs  
6.  Execute lottery (draw chip, select phrase) and pay individuals in private 
 
 To allow comparison with findings from other researchers, the objective 
probability for all combinations was fixed at ¼ (e.g., Davidson, Suppes and Siegel) for 
both treatments. The words and letters picked used for the incomplete information 
treatment was designed to jointly match the complete information (poker chip) case with 
the probability of state 1 occurring of 0.25. Specifically, the lottery questions read as 
follows: 
Complete Information Treatment Group (Group 1):  
Suppose one poker chip is drawn from a coffee can containing 40 poker chips, 
10 red and 30 white.  What is the most you would be willing to pay to play 
Lottery A instead of Lottery B? 
 
 
Incomplete Information Treatment Group (Group 2) 
 Suppose one word or letter is picked randomly from the story you have been 
read in the beginning. What is the most you would be willing to pay to play Lottery A 
instead of Lottery B? 
 
               Color of Poker Chip  Lottery A Payoff    Lottery B Payoff 
Red  $8    $8 
White  $18    $11.5 
               Word or letter picked  Lottery A Payoff    Lottery B Payoff 
“she” “it” “e” “k” “a” “o”  $8    $8 
All other words or letters  $18    $11.5 - 29 - 
This question is repeated with 20 different lottery combinations, which vary in 
terms of payoffs. The different reward combinations are designed to test the hypotheses. 
There are 4 base lotteries for lottery B (B1-B4) and there are 5 payoff combinations for 
lottery A for each of these base lotteries. The payoffs are depicted in Figure 4.  
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In designing the payoffs for the experiment, the points are based on B1 and 
include payoffs along vectors for constant absolute risk aversion and constant relative 
risk aversion vectors. They correspond to the following equations: 
Equal Incomes Vector (EIV)  1 2 y y =  




1 167 . 14 167 . 14 y y p
p y - = - =  
Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)  1 2 5 . 8 y y + - =  
Constant Relative Risk Aversion (CRRA)  1 2 5 . 0 y y =  
The payoff combinations are designed around B1 and in the context an objective - 30 - 
probability of  25 . 0 1 = p and 75 . 0 1 1 2 = - = p p . The slope of the (objective) Fair Odds 









. Lottery A for all lottery combinations 
is chosen to always be more favorable than the appropriate lottery B, thus payoffs are 
always greater or equal in both states. Base lottery B2 was chosen to test for constant 
relative risk aversion, B3 has the same expected value as B1, which is why it is on the 
FOL and B4 was chosen to test for constant absolute risk aversion.  
There are 3 payoff combinations for Lottery A representing a certainty point, such 
that irrespective of the state occurring, the reward remains the same. Lastly 2 
combinations for lottery A are designed to test for scale variance implying that they are 




A common incentive mechanism to elicit subjective probabilities is the use of 
scoring rules (Camerer, 1995). However, their use requires the assumption of risk-neutral 
preferences, which is very limiting for practical applications. The incentive mechanism 
for this study avoids assumptions on risk preferences and is modeled after a sealed-price 
auction. Participants are asked to state their willingness to pay to play lottery A instead of 
lottery B. Because lottery A is more favorable, a rational individual’s WTP will always 
be non-negative. Each subject is asked to write down their WTP on the record sheet for 
each of the 20 lottery combinations. This mechanism reflects the sealed bid auction 
scenario. Players are asked to remain quiet throughout the experiment and they are seated 
away from each other. Strategic interaction is also impossible and because the outcome of - 31 - 
the lottery is independent of other players, any incentive for strategic behavior is 
eliminated. Consequently, the private value and independence of bids assumptions hold.   
 For each experiment group one of the 20 lottery combinations will be randomly 
selected and executed. A random price (RP) between zero and the difference of the 
maximum and minimum payoff of the chosen lottery  ( ) ( ) ( ) y y min max , 0 - ˛ RP  where 
( )
B B A A y y y y 2 1 2 1 , , , = y  will be determined using the aid of a computer. All subjects with a 
willingness to pay above the random price win the right to play lottery A and all players 
below the random price will play lottery B. The experiment will then be executed by 
either drawing a chip out of a coffee can or by randomly picking a word or letter from the 
story. Following that, earnings will be determined based which lottery was played. For 
lottery A players, final earnings are determined by subtracting the random price from the 
winning payoff of the lottery based on the outcome of the random draw of the chip or 
phrase. All lottery B players will receive the payoffs based on the outcome of the random 
draw of the chip or phrase. Figure  6  illustrates the incentive mechanism and overall 
experiment set up using a flowchart.  - 32 - 
Figure 5: Flowchart of the experiment set up and incentive mechanism 
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Individual - 33 - 
A random price auction rather than an n-price auction was chosen to minimize 
strategic interactions among participants and to potentially allow more subjects to be able 
to play the more favorable lottery. Vickrey (1961) showed that there are no efficiency 
gains from using a sealed price auction with 2 n > , which would only permit one person 
to play lottery A, which could potentially discourage risk-seeking or risk-neutral subjects 
to exert the necessary effort to determine his true valuation.  The mechanism can best be 
illustrated by using a graph. Figure 7 illustrates an example where  ( )
B y y 2 1 >  such that 
the random price lies in the interval (0,
B A y y 2 2 - ). Lottery B is a lottery with payoffs 
( )
B B y y 2 1 ,  and Lottery A is the more favorable alternative with payoffs( )
B A y y 2 1 , . 
 Participants are asked to state their willingness to pay to play lottery A instead of 
Lottery B. The stated willingness to pay for any rational individual will lie in the same 
interval as the random price. To be more specific, a risk-averse individual will state a 
willingness to pay between zero and( ) b y - 1
5. A risk-seeking individual should state a 
willingness to pay between zero and( ) a b- . Lastly, a risk neutral individual should state 
a willingness to pay of( ) b y








                                                 
5 Note that ( )
B A y y 1 1 =  - 34 - 
Figure 6: Random price sealed bid reward mechanism 
 
The incentive mechanism was designed to elicit truthful statements of individual’s 
valuations. Stating a willingness to pay below the true WTP, increases the probability 
that the random price is above the stated WTP, leading to loss of the right to play lottery 
A which yields higher earnings und thus could make the person worse off. Stating a WTP 
above the true value, increases the probability that the random price is below leading to 
increased odds of playing the favorable lottery A. However, because earnings for lottery 
A are determined by subtracting the random price from the payoff of the lottery, the 
individual could be made worse off. Consequently, all subjects will be best off revealing 
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Empirical Analysis 
The first step of the empirical analysis is to estimate a utility function for each 
individual. We impose only basic restrictions on this function such that it is smooth, 
twice differentiable and monotone. We are using expected utility in combination with 
subjective probabilities to analyze the properties in question and test the hypotheses. We 
will follow 2 approaches: a) Estimating three commonly used flexible forms - the 
translog, generalized Leontief and symmetric generalized McFadden (Terrell, 1996) and 
b) function approximation.   
Flexible functional forms 
A flexible functional form is a functional form that has enough parameters to 
approximate an arbitrary twice differentiable function to the second order (Diewert, 1974, 
p. 133). The translog and generalized Leontief of both second order Taylor expansions, 
thus are local approximations.  The translog is globally well-behaved only for the special 
case of a Cobb-Douglas function (eliminating the second order terms). As Jorgenson, Lau 
and Stoker (1982) note, global monotonicity is impossible with the existence of second 
order terms that are logarithmic. The generalized Leontief is well behaved as long as all 
parameters are non-negative.  
For example, the translog function would look as follows: 
(12)   e b b + + + = = ￿￿ ￿





s s s y p y p y p a u W ln * ln ln ) ( ln ) ( , 2
1
0 y y . 
 Based on the experiments, we will be able to estimate the parameters for multiple 
functions for each individual for a number of payoff levels based on several points 
obtained thru the economic experiment. The probabilities have to sum to unity, 
￿ W ˛ =
s s 1 p  and with non-decreasing preferences they always have to be non-negative.  - 36 - 
Additionally, we will require monotone preferences. Based on equation (1), subjective 
probabilities  s p will be inferred for 2 , 1 = s . Equation (4) transforms into 
(13) 
e b
b b a a b
+ +
+ + + + = =
2 2 2 2 2 , 2 2
1
2 2 1 1 2 , 1 2
1
1 1 1 1 1 , 1 2
1
2 2 2 1 1 1 0
ln * ln
ln * ln ln * ln ln ln ) ( ln ) (
y p y p
y p y p y p y p y p y p u W y y  
Assuming scale invariance (constant absolute risk aversion) for each individual, we know 
that the Marginal Rate of Substitution between payoffs in each state has to equal the ratio 
of probabilities at the intersection of Fair Odds Line and Equal Incomes Vector. For the 



























At the intersection of objective FOL and EIV, we can then compute the subjective 
probability which will define the subjective FOL. A comparison between both Fair Odds 
Lines will indicate biases.  












implying 1 1 p < p . In this case, 25 . 0 1 = p , which is a relatively low probability that would 
have been overestimated as hypothesized. Furthermore, we can relate these estimates to 
individual and information characteristics using a limited dependent multivariate 
analysis.  
To identify risk preferences following Chambers and Quiggin (2000), the relative 
risk premium can be calculated as - 37 - 
(15)  ( ) ￿ W ˛
- =






which will also be used for comparisons between individuals. Additionally, we can 
determine if an individual displays increasing, constant or decreasing absolute and 
relative risk aversion, which can also be used for hypothesis testing. For example, if an 
individual experiences constant absolute risk aversion (CARA), the allocation of wealth 
between a safe and a risky asset will be independent of proportional increases in payoffs.  
The empirical analysis will also use a limited dependent multivariate model to test 
the remaining hypotheses and identify individual characteristics that influence risky 
behavior.  
The generalized Leontief demand is defined as 
(16)  y y y y A a a W ' ' 2 ) ( 0 + + = , 
where  0 a is a scale parameter,  ais a vector of parameters,  yis the vector of 
payoffs and  [ ] ij a A =  is a symmetric matrix of parameters. For the case of 2 states, the 
generalized Leontief will transform to 
(17) 
2
2 22 2 1 21 2 1 12
2
1 11 2 2 1 1 0 2 2 ) ( y a y y a y y a y a y a y a a W + + + + + + = y   
Estimation Procedure 
Utility of indifference points is the same so we can use that to determine a 
relationship between estimates. A limited dependent multivariate analysis (logit or probit) 
will use the difference between the objective and subjective probability as the dependent 
variable for state 1: 1 1 p - p . For the limited dependent model, it would have to be the 
probability that we have overestimation. We could also use the actual difference to also - 38 - 
capture magnitude effects. A negative value for this difference implies overestimation of 
the objective probability.  
(18)   ( ) e b b a p + + + + + = - Info on RiskAversi p INFO R c d Culture β Demo β 1 1 , where  
Age Gender age gen b b + = Demo  
LTO MAS InI UAI PDI LTO MAS InI UAI PDI b b b b b + + + + = Culture  
Info is a dummy variable with value equal to 1 (one) if subjects have complete 
information. Secondly, the equation will be estimated separately for both treatment 
groups to analyze differences in coefficient estimates for the other variables.  
According to the basic hypotheses outlined before, this implies: 
H 1`:   0 < a  for  r < p ,where r  is small and determined by the data. Roughly speaking 




 Rather than assuming a specific structure of the underlying functional form as 
with the flexible functional forms described above, interpolation methods are used to 
approximate an analytically intractable function  f with a computationally tractable 
function f ˆ , given limited information (Miranda and Fackler, 2002). Constricting the 
analysis to the more practical linear combination of set of n known linearly independent 
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It is also important to keep in mind that there are n unknown parameters requiring 
n conditions to be able to fix an approximant. The first condition is that the approximant - 39 - 
matches the value of the original function at the interpolation nodes  n x x x ,..., , 2 1  
(available data points). Consequently, one fixes the coefficients  n c c c ,..., , 2 1  of  fˆ by 
solving  





j j x f x c = ￿
=
f   n i ,... 1 = "  







j j i x c x f e
1
) ( ) ( f   
Leading to the least squared result 
(22)  y φ φ φ c ' ) ' (
1 - =  
with y φc =
6,  ) ( i i x f y = and  ) ( i j ij x f f = . The analysis can be extended to interpolate 
function values as well as derivates at specified points (Miranda and Fackler, 2002). 
There are two practical approaches to function approximation: Chebyshev polynomial 
and polynomial spline approximation. The interpolation methods can be extended for the 
multivariate case as necessary for this study.  
 
Results 
The first round of experiments was conducted April 28, 2006 with 10 students 
from the Principles of Macroeconomics class at the Department of Applied Economics at 
the University of MN. Average earnings were approximately $8.00, which was below 
                                                 
6 φ is the interpolation matrix, which has to be non-singular. - 40 - 
expectations. The first round of experiments yielded in indifference curves that greatly 
violated all standard assumptions. We therefore conducted a second round of experiments 
without the rest of the questionnaire with a practice round to familiarize subjects with the 
payoff structure and incentive mechanism. The results are promising but still not yet 
enough to start estimating functional forms for the utility function.  
Summary Statistics 
The first sample consisted of 40% females and 100% Caucasian, who were 
between 20 and 22 years old, grew up in Minnesota (70%), North Dakota (10%) and 
Wisconsin (20%), and who except for one person lived in Minnesota at their current 
residence for at least 7 years. The remaining person lives in Wisconsin. The majority 
(80%) rated their political views as center (40%) to conservative (40%) and also rated 
their family’s income as well as future income prospects as intermediate (3 on a scale 
from 1 to 5). Personal savings was used to supplement income from parents, the 
government or salary income. In our sample, 4 subjects did not work, while 3 were 
working part-time and full-time during breaks, respectively (1 subject was working part-
time and full-time during breaks). 50% of our sample receives support by his or her 
parents, 50% from the government and 50% from salary income or a combination of all 
three sources of income.  
 
Cultural Dimensions 
Cultural Dimensions are similar to Hofstede’s (2001) results for the US for all 
indices but deviations correspond to expectations one would have considering the sample. 
We surveyed undergraduate students who are going to be well-educated, more socially - 41 - 
aware individuals for whom gender equality and consideration for the future are part of 
this education. The indices computed for our sample in comparison with the indices 
computed by Hofstede for the US can be found in Figure 6.  
Figure 7: Comparison of 1

















The index for power distance (PDI) measures the extent to which members of the 
society expect and accept that power is distributed unequally. A low score indicates small 
power distance (more equal distribution of power) and equivalently a high score indicates 
large power distance. The US in general exhibits an average PDI but our sample is 
significantly lower expressing more aptitude for an equal distribution of power. The 
individualism index (IDV) a low score represents strongly collectivist while a high score 
indicates strongly individualist that is the ties between individuals are loose and a person 
is expected to look after her/himself. Low values of the masculinity index (MAS) indicate 
values of strongly feminine and consequently high values represent strongly masculine. 
In cultures with low MAS scores, gender roles overlap.  
Uncertainty avoidance is expected be the index with the most predictive power for 
risk attitudes and perceptions. It is designed to capture the extent to which members of a 
society feel threatened by uncertain, unknown, ambiguous or unstructured events and - 42 - 
situations. A low score stands for weak uncertainty avoidance that is members of the 
society feel weakly threatened. Lastly, long-term orientation (LTO) versus short-term 
measures how much a society is oriented towards the future rewards. A society oriented 
to the long-term (high score) will foster virtues like perseverance and thrift while a 
society with a short-term orientation (low score) will foster virtues related to the past and 
present like tradition and fulfilling social obligations.  
 
Risk Preferences and Perceptions  
A first glance at the original sample and responses reveals a lack of understanding 
of the incentive mechanism as well as some inconsistencies. However, the initial glance 
also reveals an overall tendency for willingness to pay to be lower when information is 
restricted. Table 3 provides an overview of differences in willingness to for the first set of 
4 lotteries, which use the same base lottery B1.  































Lottery 1 Lottery 2 Lottery 3 Lottery 4
Pokerchips Story
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Combining both samples, we can depict average willingness to pay for lottery A 
for the poker chips versus the story group. Results are shown in Figure 9.  
Figure 9: Average Willingness to Pay for lottery A – Story (incomplete information) versus 
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It can bee seen that the willingness to pay is on average smaller for the incomplete 
(story) information treatment group for all lottery combinations. This effect could be due 
to either a misunderstanding of the payoff mechanism or actual differences in risk 
perceptions. In a second step, we looked at the derived indifference curves for each 
individual. Simply for illustrative purposes, two examples are depicted in Figure 9.  
Figure 10: Sample Indifference Curves for Players 2 (Poker Chips) and 21 (Story) 

































































 - 44 - 
Figure 11 and 11 look at the base lottery B1 and computed indifference points for 
all individuals depending on the treatment. The shaded areas represent the irrationality 
space that is subject to doubt whether participants understood the payoff mechanism. The 
irrationality space is defined as the space where the payoffs for both evens are smaller 
than the base lottery B1 thru B4. Without any formal analysis, it appears as a) individuals 
are risk-averse, b) individual’s risk preferences differs and c) the slope of the indifference 
curves (for the rational answers in both groups) is steeper on the equal incomes vector for 
the incomplete information group. The later observation indicates that risk perceptions 
might be influenced by information and the lack of complete information seems to make 
individuals overestimate the low probability more than if all information is available.  
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These initial results based on the first sample show that improvements in the 
experimental set up are necessary. The introduction of the practice round proved 
successful in that the indifference curves are more stable and consistent. To step ahead, 
we estimated a functional form for the indifference curves for lottery combinations based 
on B5, computed the tangency line at the intersection with the equal incomes vector and 
compared the slopes (derived subjective probabilities) to the objective probability fair 
odds line. The results although preliminary are illustrated in Figure 13. The on average 
steeper slopes for the tangency line (subjective fair odds line) for most subjects seem to 
confirm that subjects overestimate low and underestimate high probabilities. 
Furthermore, we can see that as anticipated, the subjective FOL is close to the objective 
FOL for some people in the group with practice rounds under complete information and 
to a lesser extend for the incomplete group. Assuming this result holds up for a 
representative sample, this could confirm that an increase in information leads to more 
accurate probability assessment and eliminates some of the bias.  - 46 - 



























In summary, although the results have to be estimated more precisely, it appears 
as if we can confirm the already established result that individuals overestimate low 
probabilities and underestimate high probabilities. This effect is even more pronounced 
when information is incomplete. Lastly, not surprisingly risk preferences as well as 
perceptions differ between individuals. An additional induced value experiment will be 
used to validate the incentive mechanism. A prediction of probabilities experiment will 
be used to narrow down on the influence of information on probability assessments/risk 
perceptions. In combination, we should be able to support many if not all hypotheses of 
the research objective.  
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Appendix 
Selected Short Story:  
Hans Christian Andersen: The Princess and the Pea 
 
Once upon a time there was a prince who wanted to marry a princess; but she would have 
to be a real princess. He traveled all over the world to find one, but nowhere could he get 
what he wanted. There were princesses enough, but it was difficult to find out whether 
they were real ones. There was always something about them that was not as it should be. 
So he came home again and was sad, for he would have liked very much to have a real 
princess.  
     One evening a terrible storm came on; there was thunder and lightning, and the rain 
poured down in torrents. Suddenly a knocking was heard at the city gate, and the old king 
went to open it. It was a princess standing out there in front of the gate. But, good 
gracious! What a sight the rain and the wind had made her look. The water ran down 
from her hair and clothes; it ran down into the toes of her shoes and out again at the heels. 
And yet she said that she was a real princess. Well, we will
7 soon find that out, thought 
the old queen. But she said nothing, went into the bed-room, took all the bedding off the 
bedstead, and laid a pea on the bottom; then she took twenty mattresses and laid them on 
the pea, and then twenty eider-down beds on top of the mattresses. On this the princess 
had to lie all night. In the morning she was asked how she had slept. “Oh, very badly!” 
said she. “I have scarcely closed my eyes all night. Heaven only knows what was in the 
bed, but I was lying on something hard, so that I am black and blue all over my body. It’s 
horrible!” Now they knew that she was a real princess because she had felt the pea right 
through the twenty mattresses and the twenty eider-down beds. Nobody but a real 
princess could be as sensitive as that. So the prince took her for his wife, for now he 
knew that he had a real princess; and the pea was put in the museum, where it may still be 
seen, if no one has stolen it.  
There, that is a true story. 
 
                                                 
7 The original translation of the story reads “we’ll” instead of “we will”. However, it was changed to 
facilitate the composition of the objective probability I an effort to find letters and words with a combined 
probability of occurring as close to .25 as possible.  - 52 - 
Computation of objective probability for incomplete information (story) group 
The story has 380 words and 1,476 letter excluding title and author. We have 
numbered these words from 1-380 and letters from 381 to 1856. We randomly drew a 
number from 1 to 1855 such that each number is equally likely. The word or letter 
associated with that number determined the outcome of both lotteries for the selected 
decision problem. For example, if the randomly selected number drawn was 274 the 
associated 274







occuring phrase P , where  p x  are the # of times the p elements of the phrase, 
i.e. “she” “it” “e” “k” “a” “o”, and  Gis the word and letter space, which occur in the 
story. In particular, the objective probability underlying this experiment was 0.25 for both 
the poker chip and the story group. The phrase for the lotteries in the story group was 
designed to match that. Table 2 provides the probabilities of the individual components 
that determined the probability of one of the element of the phrase occurring.  
 
Table 2: Probabilities for each component of the phrase for the lotteries using the story to 
determine the outcome 
Phrase 
p x  -  # of times, phrase 
occurs in the story 
Probability 
she  10  0.54% 
it  8  0.43% 
e  200  10.78% 
k  13  0.70% 
a
8  129  6.95% 
o  104  5.60% 
Total    25.00% 
     
 
 
                                                 
8 Counts double as a letter and as a word 